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Abstract 
This study analyses a baseline dataset collected for an evaluation of a co-operation 
project that assists trade unions in Zambia to boost their activities. The data were 
collected from 51 establishments to study attitudes towards unions, working conditions 
and the views of employers and trade union representatives on each other. The results 
show that employees have, by and large, positive views on unions but turning to unions 
when there are problems is not particularly common. Wages are often considered to be 
too low and assumed to be lower than those of similar individuals elsewhere or even in 
the same establishment. Regression analysis shows that having positive views on unions 
per se has a positive association with satisfaction and negative correlation with resign 
intentions. Union membership, however, seems to be correlated with employees being 
more discontent with their wages in some instances, though the direction of causality is 
unclear.  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
This report outlines the first results from the baseline survey of an evaluation of the 
development co-operation of SASK (The Finnish Trade Union Solidarity Centre) in 
Zambia. The main aim is to establish to what extent unions serve as a discussion 
platform and information exchange and are thus overall efficiency enhancing, along the 
lines of the theory of the union “voice” effect described by Richard Freeman and James 
Medoff in their seminal work on unions (1984). Similarly, the impact of industrial 
relations on wage, perceptions thereof and occupational health and safety are the focus 
of this study. Together with the follow-up study, the evaluation will investigate whether 
a co-operation project with the local union enhances these effects or has other 
quantifiable positive effects at the workplace, and whether the impact is possibly 
dependent on various background factors. 
It is well known (for a survey, see Kangasniemi and Pirttilä 2013) that too rigid 
regulation may even increase the wage gap between the formal and informal sectors 
and constrain the amount of formal employment, as there may not be adequate 
incentives to formalise employment in the presence of strict regulation and relatively 
low productivity. Thus, the impact of labour market institutions such as unions can be 
either to enhance efficiency and compress wage distribution (as in the case of 
developed countries) or in some cases actually widen inequalities. 
Considerations of sufficient pay and employment protection aside, any employment 
should satisfy the minimum conditions of physical safety. Similarly, abolishing forced 
labour, limiting freedom, the worst forms of child labour and discrimination are core 
labour standards that should be implemented, irrespective of efficiency considerations. 
Unions and employers may have a role to play in improving these issues with other 
institutions, such as the government and other authorities who set the ground rules and 
provide information on them. Therefore, one element of the impact that we study is 
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how these phenomena are linked to the union presence at the workplace and how co-
operation from developed countries can help to strengthen the positive linkages. 
The voice effect may be particularly important in developing countries because of the 
low general enforcement of labour standards, whereas the protection provided by 
unions can serve as insurance when overall social security or social protection policies 
are largely missing or largely incomplete. It has to be noted that this does not 
necessarily imply that overall unions in developing countries are optimal labour market 
institutions. Union membership may be the cause of another source of inequality if it is 
not accessible to everyone and, on the other hand, other policies such as building social 
protection systems or other forms of labour market institutions may provide even 
better outcomes.  
There are several reasons why trade unions may fall short of the optimal outcome even 
when there are potential gains from unionisation. Unions may have other objectives 
that override the improvement of labour standards or productivity, or they may only 
serve the interests of insiders at the cost of outsiders. Unions may be highly adversarial 
and have high transaction costs, as there are limited channels for worker voices outside 
formal union channels in the traditional form of unionism, which ultimately leads to a 
rejection of unionism. This has happened, for example, in the United States (Hirsch 
2007). 
The distributional effects of unions may mainly benefit unionised workers, unless the 
‘threat’ effect of unionisation is very strong. It can also be argued that the positive voice 
effects cannot exist without the negative ‘monopoly face’ (Kaufman and Bennett 2007). 
In order for a union to effectively promote positive objectives it will have to possess 
some monopoly power. Even if the positive effect of unions is observed in the empirical 
data, it may hide a large negative effect. The institution that serves as the voice of the 
workers does not necessarily need to be a union in the traditional sense. There may be 
alternative institutional forms that are capable of attaining similar positive outcomes. 
4 
 
The modes of union behaviour, as well as the degree of co-operationin industrial 
relations, vary a lot. 
To our knowledge there has not been a study whereby an intervention involving trade 
unions has been tested by using this approach. This is quite surprising, since 
interventions can be used as an attempt to improve labour standards, something which 
is high on the agenda of global development objectives. Moreover, interventions are of 
the type that could be subject to rigorous impact evaluation, at least when they deal 
with firm-level or worker-level outcome variables. While potential outcomes can be 
somewhat abstract, they are quite similar to topics (such as job satisfaction) that are 
routinely investigated using surveys and interviews in developed countries. 
Zambia is a lower middle income economy1 which has experienced significant rates of 
economic growth during the last decade. However, the growth has not generated an 
equally impressive amount of high quality employment, and the unemployment rate 
remains high.  Poverty is still widespread and a large share of employment is informal. 
Thus, there remains scope for improvement in terms of the quality of employment and 
the extent to which  jobs created by economic growth reduce vulnerability. Nationwide 
representative statistics on the quality of working life are not produced frequently: the 
Labour Force Survey is only conducted every four years, which further emphasises the 
need to collect new data.  
We hope this study will shed further light on these issues in the context of the Zambian 
labour market and, more specifically, will explore whether factors such as union 
membership, employees’ trust in unions or  employers’ and unions’ views on each other 
will  influence employee outcomes such as job satisfaction. 
 
                                                          
1 According to the World Bank classification, Zambia is a lower middle income economy but it is 
still listed by the UN as one of the least developed countries. 
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2. Background 
Despite the fact that Zambia has ratified all the eight fundamental ILO conventions, 
there is clearly still a need for improvement in terms of accomplishing the goals of the 
decent work agenda. According to the ILO Decent work country report (2012), the 
statutory minimum wage falls below the basic need level. Child labour is still an issue of 
major concern. A majority of people hold unstable and insecure jobs. There are several 
acts aimed at protecting employees from unlawful termination of employment as well 
as discrimination, but casual and temporary labour are outside the scope of much of the 
legislation. The enforcement of health and safety regulations is inadequate. 
The Industrial and Labour Relations Act establishes the right of every employee to join a 
trade union. The same act obliges employers with more than 25 employees to enter a 
recognition agreement with a trade union and undertake collective bargaining. 
However, union membership has been  in decline and a large share of employees do not 
have trade union representation. Informal workers naturally fall completely outside 
collective bargaining. 
The main sector included in this study, construction, is currently experiencing a strong 
boom and likely to benefit from sustained growth and from the growing infrastructure 
needs of the economy in the future. Thus, the construction sector is also projected to 
employ a growing number of people. At the same time, atypical and casual work as well 
as informal businesses are common in this sector, and working conditions vary largely 
across companies and individuals. The presence of multinational companies and migrant 
workers presents further challenges to the quality of working life and labour rights in 
this sector. The sector thus represents many of the typical issues of concern of the 
labour markets in developing countries. 
The casualisation of labour is widely considered to be a major problem. According to the 
ILO (2012), for example, most of the growth in employment in the mining sector has 
been labour that is employed by contractors and labour brokers. There do not seem to 
6 
 
be solid nationwide statistics on casualisation. The ILO reports, though, that the share of 
people in “precarious” employment (temporary, seasonal and involuntary part-time) 
was 59.10% of paid employees in 2008 and 69.35% in 2005. An amendment to the 
Employment Act enacted at the end of 2015 implies that it is illegal to hire employees 
on a casual basis for any job that is of a permanent nature but the actual effects of this 
law are not yet known. 
The Zambian labour market laws are currently in the process of being reviewed. The aim 
is not so much to change the overall strictness of the law but to remove inconsistencies. 
As with regulation in general, compliance is a major stumbling block, especially as 
resources for enforcement and monitoring are scarce. As in many developing countries, 
the problem is not altogether the lack of regulation per se but the lack of compliance. 
According to our interviewees, small companies often find labour law too complicated 
and costly and thus decide not to comply at all. There is a serious lack of resources for 
enforcement and there is little co-ordination within the government in labour issues. 
According to Labour Force Survey 2012 (CSO 2013), the share of informal employment 
stands as 84.6% of total employment (Table 1). During the previous LFS in 2008 it was 
89.0% and in 2005 90.91%. Thus, the share of informal jobs seems to be very persistent. 
Some efforts have been made to improve the situation of informal workers. For 
example, domestic workers have an association and the ILO has managed to assign a 
code of conduct for employers of domestic workers with ZFE. 
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Estimates of basic labour market indicators from  
Labour Force Survey 2012 
Population 14375601 
Working age population 7861259 
Labour force 5966199 
Employment 5499673 
Formal sector employment 847420 
Formal sector employment, % of 
total employment 15.4 
Construction sector, total 
employment 187906 
Transport sector, total 
employment 137301 
Construction sector, share of 
formal employment 19.50 % 
Transport sector, share of formal 
employment 45.10 % 
Average weekly hours of work  38.7 
Average weekly hours of work, 
construction  48.6 
Average weekly hours of work, 
transport 67.4 
Average monthly earnings K1724106 (334.77 USD) 
Average monthly earnings, 
formal sector 
K2215688 (430.23 
USD) 
Table 1. Basic statistics from Labour Force Survey 2012 
The construction sector is one of the fastest growing sectors and has a strong presence 
of foreign companies (Sutton and Langmead 2013). The Trade Union Solidarity Centre 
NUBEWG or National Union for Building Engineering and General Workers is a multi-
sector union that also represents workers in the construction industry. Of all NUBEGW 
members 94.5% are men and 5.5% are women and the total number of members 11148 
(2011-2012). The number of companies covered by the union is currently 134. 
In the construction sector NUBEGW considers the presence of foreign and multinational 
companies that are often suspected of labour rights breaches and low health and safety 
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standards as one of the main issues. The language barrier introduces an element of 
imperfect communication between workers and management, further aggravating the 
situation. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that people often work long hours without overtime pay, 
are paid less than the minimum wage and have no right to sick leave. Casualisation of 
work and very short contracts are common in the construction sector. It is suspected 
that child labour is also used within the sector. There have also been reports of workers 
having to buy their own protective clothing. There is also a need for workers to be 
educated on issues of health and safety. 
One of the central issues of occupational health and safety in the construction sector, 
according to NUBEGW, is the rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic. Owing to the seasonal nature 
of construction, workers often reside away from their permanent residence, which 
contributes to the spread of the epidemic. There are also reports of sexual harassment 
of female workers. 
There are fears that with the sector booming it will become even more difficult to 
enforce the labour laws and health and safety regulations. On the other hand, when the 
sector dwindles, the unions also lose members, which further contracts their resources. 
The employer side of the construction sector is regulated by the National Council of 
Construction, which is an arm of the government. However, there are businesses 
outside the membership of the NCC. In the case of those businesses, it is very difficult 
for the union to intervene even when there is an obvious case for such intervention. 
Labour Force Survey 2012 was a nationwide survey covering household populations in 
all the ten provinces. The population estimate of individuals in paid employment is 
1,120,178, whereas the estimate of the total number of employed people is 5,499,673. 
Thus, the share of paid employees is 20.1%  (CSO 2013). At the population level, the 
number of individuals working in construction is estimated to be 187,906, and in 
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transportation and storage 137,301. The share of paid employees in each of these 
sectors is 42.8% and 75.1%. This is relatively high. For example, the share of paid 
employmees in the two largest industries, agriculture and trade, (as opposed to self-
employed and unpaid family workers) is even lower (CSO 2013). The term “formal 
employment” is used when defined as the number of people employed in formally 
registered companies, central government, local government or parastatals. The shares 
of these in both of the sectors, respectively, are 19.5% and 45.1%. The population-level 
estimate of average pay for paid employees is K1,724,0612 (335 USD), which at the 
inflation rate of 6.98% in 2013 and 7.84% in 2014 would equal K1990 (324 USD) at the 
price level of 2014. 
The co-operation work conducted by the Trade Union Solidarity Centre consists of 
various activities such as training and education aimed at building union strength 
through training union officials and activists in organising, recruitment and campaigning 
as well as project management, finances and administration. At the workplace level co-
operation activities can be targeted at shop stewards. More specifically, in addition to 
strengthening the union organisation in general, the work projected to be carried out in 
Zambia includes occupational health and safety workshops for shop stewards. 
As the coverage and the likely effects of some of the elements of the co-operation are 
limited to specific workplaces, their impact can be evaluated by using the RCT 
methodology described below. Though the focus of the training is occupational health 
and safety, it is possible that increased awareness of the presence of the union or 
changes of attitudes towards unions occurs in addition to the possible changes in the 
knowledge of OHS and labour rights.  
                                                          
2  The kwacha was rebased on 1st January 2013 at the rate of 1 new kwacha =1000 old kwacha. 
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3. Research methodology 
The survey analysed in this report constitutes the first stage of an evaluation of the SASK 
co-operation work in Zambia. The impact of the SASK co-operation work in the 
construction sector will be studied by using a randomised controlled trial methodology. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to infer causality. In 
observational studies, or in a typical qualitative analysis, it is often impossible to 
determine whether the detected developments are caused by a particular intervention 
or whether they have taken place for another reason. In a careful econometric impact 
evaluation, one measures the interesting outcome variable before and after the 
intervention. Data collection is conducted not only in those units of analysis that are 
subject to the intervention but also in a comparison group. The comparison group 
should consist of units that are similar to the treatment group so that the only reason 
why outcomes should vary between the treated and the control units is the 
intervention. The best way to ensure that the groups are alike is via randomisation: then 
subjects cannot choose themselves whether they become subject to the intervention or 
not. For a thorough discussion of the approach, see Banerjee and Duflo (2009).  
It is clear that such an approach is not suitable for every possible research question: 
macro policies can hardly be randomised across countries. It is often uncertain to what 
extent the results can be generalised for other settings. (This is the question about 
external validity.) And while it can be argued that the experimental approach can reveal 
what works and what does not work, the question as to why something happens is often 
left unanswered. However, the last problem can be alleviated by careful design: the 
experiment can involve different types of interventions that are being tested at the 
same time against the no-intervention case and, in the best possible situation, the 
experiment deals directly with a particular behavioural mechanism (Mullainathan et al. 
2011).  
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At this point we assume that the intervention will be made at the establishment or, in 
statistical terms, cluster level. This may mean, for example, training trade union 
representatives or targeting specific establishments in a membership campaign. The co-
operation projects typically include training on health and safety issues that can be 
targeted at a certain set of establishments through training their shop stewards. Thus, 
we can assume that the impact can also be best identified at the cluster level. 
Information and skills spill overs (employees learning from each other) are also likely to 
occur within establishments, which further supports the need for the sampling to take 
place at the establishment level. 
Some of the impact of the project (such as the improved media presence of the union, 
or general efforts to improve the organising of construction workers or awareness of the 
union issues) is also likely to occur at the sectoral level. These effects cannot be 
identified with certainty, though a comparison of the situation in the baseline survey 
and the follow-up may give a descriptive indication of either the impact of the project or 
general trends in those issues. However, the most precise measure of impact can be 
attained for the intervention that is only applied to a randomly selected group of 
establishments. 
More specifically, some of the issues we wish to measure are perceptions of unions and 
their role in the establishment in question as well as in Zambia in general, and 
occupational health and safety (incidence of accidents and work-related illnesses) as a 
concrete measure of the impact of education. We also inquire whether employees 
consider unions as their first point of contact in the case of grievance or suggestion as a 
proxy for the scope for the “voice” role that the union may play in the establishment. 
The aim of using the latter is to establish whether increased knowledge of the union 
presence can enhance information exchange and productivity in the plant as well as 
their subjective welfare of workers through having a reliable point of contact for raising 
their grievances. 
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The union representatives and the employer representatives are similarly interviewed 
about their perceptions of each other as well as which issues are either discussed or 
negotiated between them, and the quality of the dialogue. 
4. Baseline survey 
The baseline survey was carried out in two phases in June 2014 and February 2015. The 
intention was to cover all implementation of the RCT approach.  In the case of SASK, 
intervention in Zambia will consist of a baseline survey and a follow-up survey which will 
be conducted after the intervention has taken place. 
The number of workplaces covered in the first phase was 31 and in the second phase 20. 
One company was interviewed during both rounds. The aim was to collect all the data 
during the first phase, but experience showed that companies need to be contacted well 
beforehand in order to attain a maximum response rate. Ultimately, six of the 
companies whose names were provided by the union did not participate in the survey. 
In the transport sector there were also a number of refusals during the first round but, 
as is explained below, no attempt was made to contact them in the second round. 
An attempt was made to interview a random sample of employees from each company. 
In practice, randomisation was possible in 20 companies, and in the rest convenient 
sampling was used, for example in choosing volunteers. Human resources and the union 
survey did not have a full response rate either; both had responses from 40 companies. 
In total there are 34 companies for which we have all human resources, union and 
employee questionnaires. In most of the analysis we make use of the employee survey. 
In some of the regressions we use the employer and union representative 
characteristics as explanatory variables as this allows us to draw some conclusions on 
how, if at all, they are reflected by the employees’ experiences. 
During the initial phase it was still assumed that the transport sector would be covered 
by SASK co-operation work and nine of the companies would be from the transport 
13 
 
sector. Though the transport sector has since been excluded from co-operation in the 
immediate future, these observations may serve as a useful comparison point for the 
construction sector to establish to what extent certain features are sector specific. 
The questionnaires consisted of a large number of questions concerning individual 
characteristics, their perceptions of the quality of industrial relations, conditions of work 
and opinions on trade unions and employers. The co-operation work has a potential 
impact on several of these issues. 
• The potential for the “voice” effect: Do unions effectively operate as a discussion 
platform between workers and management, thereby improving efficiency? Are 
they perceived as such by the actors? 
• Trust between employees, unions and management 
• Views on the role of trade unions and unionism in Zambian society and economy: 
Do union membership and the added resources to union activities change views 
about what unions can and should do in Zambian society? 
• Training and productivity enhancement: opportunities to participate in training 
activities and to contribute to improving work practices by providing suggestions 
Missing observations were relatively infrequent in the case of employee questionnaires 
and trade union questionnaires, but there was a relatively large number of missing 
information in the employer questionnaire, mainly due to a large number on questions 
on the structure of the company personnel. 
5. Results from the baseline survey 
In this chapter we outline some central results from the baseline survey. The main focus 
is to describe the general perceptions of the unions and experiences of the quality of 
working conditions. Furthermore, we have run regressions whereby we have examined 
the impact of union membership and level of activism and the characteristics of 
industrial relations within the workplace on wages and various measures of job quality 
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and job and wage satisfaction. We also study the impact of the views of unions and 
employers on each other and the level of knowledge of the union representative on 
occurrences of accidents and labour rights violations and also employees turning to the 
union in case of grievances. 
5.1 Profile of respondents 
Of the employees surveyed 82% were from the construction sector firms and the rest 
from the transport sector. The share of union members in the survey is 67% and thus 
much higher than in Zambia in general. Of the respondents 58% worked in skilled blue 
collar occupations, 25% in unskilled blue collar occupations and the rest represented 
professionals and managers. Ofthe respondents 81% had a written contract and can 
thus be considered as formally employed. Also, this share is much higher than in the 
sectors in question overall. The average age of the respondents was 37.8 years and only 
7% were female. Monthly earnings were approximated by adding the earnings in the 
previous month (using the midpoint of each wage category) and the estimated 
monetary value of in kind benefits. The average approximate (using midpoints of 
categories of earnings given in the questionnaire) monthly earnings were 2591 ZMW 
(421 USD). 
5.2 Employees’ attitudes towards unions 
Of those respondents who were members of unions 57.5 % participated in some form, 
either by following the union activities or actively being involved. All the reasons 
suggested in the questionnaire to join a union were mentioned quite frequently as being 
important. Those reasons include interest in receiving information about rights at work, 
to guarantee that wage rates at the workplace are negotiated with a union, to 
guarantee job security, to have someone who is reliable to turn to in case of grievance, 
to have someone to give support  and safeguard the respondent’s employment if she or 
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he wants to discuss work-related issues with the employer and to support workers’ 
movement in general. 
The question about why people have not joined a union does not provide an obvious 
reason why people do not join. The only suggested reasons where over half of the 
respondents said that the reason was at least of minor importance was the statement 
that unions were too weak to make a difference and that unions were too fragmented. 
The general perception of trade unions in Zambia was positive (Figure 1), with the 
exception of statements on unions helping casual workers or unemployed members. 
Unions were perceived to have an impact on the working conditions and wages of their 
members, and, to a lesser extent, on those of all members, and they were perceived to 
have a role as a source of information of rights and employers’ views and strategies. 
With all these over half of the respondents agreed or agreed strongly. 
There is a fair amount of confidence in the impact of industrial action among 
employees: 81% of respondents believe that wage rates can be influenced by it. Over 
half also believed that changes in conditions of employment and occupational health 
and safety could be influenced by industrial action. Most (54%) believe, however, that 
industrial action is unlikely or highly unlikely in their establishment. 
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Figure 1. Employees’ opinions on unions in Zambia 
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5.3 Wage satisfaction and quality of work 
The questionnaire included a number of questions on how respondents felt about their 
wage as described by its adequacy to support their household and a number of 
questions on how high they believed their wage to be compared with other employees 
in the same establishment, individuals with similar skills in the same establishment, in 
the same sector and in the same region in Zambia (Figure 2). The respondents typically 
perceive their wage to be below others or other similar workers in their establishment 
and Zambia, and compared with other establishments. A large majority (88%) finds it at 
least difficult to cope on their wage (Figure 3). However, the majority (52%) think it is 
unlikely they will resign from their job in the next twelve months, which suggests that 
Figure 2. Employees’ perceptions of their relative wage 
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either they do not believe they will be able to find a better paid job or that the non-
wage elements of the job compensate for the low wage. 
 
5.4 Health and safety and experiences of discrimination 
Issues with job quality and decent work were investigated by asking employees  about 
their experiences or witnessing harmful workplace practices and accidents and work-
related illnesses (Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
The most common problems experienced and witnessed at work were having to work 
excessive overtime, threats of dismissal and working with limited freedom. A majority 
(70%) had not experienced an accident or a work-related illness, and serious injuries or 
illnesses were rare. The union representatives were also asked about occurrences of 
accidents or  work-related illnesses: in the majority of establishments these had not 
Figure 3. Employees’ perceptions of the adequacy of their wage 
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occurred, but, for example, 27% stated that accidents leading to serious injury had 
occurred and 27.5% stated that accidents had led to moderate injury. 16% of employees 
reported having experienced discrimination at work. 
 
 
Figure 4. Employees’ experiences of labour rights violations 
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Figure 5. Employees’ experiences of workplace injury 
Figure 6.  Employees’ experiences of work-related illnesses 
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5.5 A union’s role as the workers’ voice 
The questionnaires had several questions on whether complaints and grievances as well 
as suggestions of improvement were channelled through unions, human resources or 
other parties. 
Even union members do not most typically turn to the union but more often to other 
parties (the company HR and supervisor being the most important) (Figure 7). It is most 
typical to turn to the union in the case of dismissal or a dispute over wages. In the case 
of other topics of complaint (working time, leave, health and safety, contents of the job 
and discrimination) it is relatively infrequent to turn to the union. 
Union representatives believe the union to be the first point of contact in most cases 
(67.5%) but in the case of non-members and casual workers it was less important. A 
Figure 7. Employees’ views on who they turn to in case of complaints or grievances 
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similar pattern holds for suggestions: 60% of union representatives believed the union 
to be the first contact for suggestions from union members. 
46% of the employers’ representatives also stated that they “often”received complaints 
from the union. Almost as many mentioned “often”receiving complaints  through 
employees’ supervisors. Other channels were less often used. Suggestions were 
mentioned as “often” coming from supervisors in 30% of the cases and from the union 
in 22% of them. 
Most employers (75%) responded that they had a positive attitude towards union 
membership and the rest stated that their attitude was neutral. By and large, the union 
was considered as professional and acting with integrity and honesty. Similarly, trade 
union representatives had positive views on employers. In 72.5 % of companies there 
were also meetings between staff and the management, suggesting that in addition to 
trade unions there are other discussion platforms for the employer and employees. 
5.6 Determinants of wage, subjective perceptions of wage and resignation 
intentions 
We ran regressions on the logarithm of wages and on the subjective perception of the 
adequacy of the wage as well as its relation to other people’s wages. Instead of using 
ordered probit or logit we used simple OLS regression in this descriptive analysis3. The 
main regression results are presented in Appendix 1: here we describe them briefly. 
The explanatory variables include age, age squared, tenure, gender, education, 
occupation, type of contract (written contract, permanent or fixed-term, part-time or 
full-time), sector, dummies indicating the interview round, a set of dummies indicating 
                                                          
3 We also carried out ordered probit , probit or tobit analysis for the outcome variables for which the 
range or number of values is limited, calculating the marginal effects of the variables of interest when 
the coefficient alone was not adequate to draw inference on the direction of the impact. The results 
were in line with those obtained from simple linear regressions, and available on request. 
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combinations of region, interview round and interviewer id4 and the level of 
participation in union activities. These variables were generally used in all the 
regressions below.  
We created a composite variable from the questions regarding attitudes and trust 
towards unions. The variable measures the number of positive responses relative to the 
number of questions responded to. The questions concern issues such as whether 
unions have an impact on the wages of the members and employees in general, 
whether they are an important source of information and whether they are concerned 
about casual workers and the unemployed. 
There does not seem to be a union wage premium per se: union membership or higher 
levels of activism do not have a statistically significant relationship to the logarithm of 
wage. This may be simply due to the fact that the unions are present in each company 
and the wage negotiated by them also applies to those who are not members or 
effectively non-members and members represent different occupational groups or types 
of contracts, and any wage differential is picked up by the coefficients of these variables. 
Generally, occupational categories have some explanatory power over the wage 
regressions, and when firm effects are not controlled for, having received training raises 
the wage significantly. Those with a written contract have an almost significantly (p-
value 0.076) higher wage and those with a fixed term contract a similarly (p-value 0.056) 
higher wage. Introducing firm effects, however, makes these effects less significant, 
though occupational categories are still significant determinants of wage levels. 
We run regressions on wage satisfaction by using different subjective outcome 
measures, as well as those on resignation intentions, which are another measure of job 
satisfaction. The logarithm of wage was controlled for, and thus the results indicate the 
impact of various characteristics that occur beyond those arising from actual differences 
                                                          
4 The interviewer id was generally not available for the second round. Thus for these observations region 
and interview round are controlled for.  
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in wages. People with fixed term contracts considered their wage to be generally lower 
than those of other individuals or individuals with similar characteristics at their 
establishment. Having a written contract had a positive correlation with perceptions of 
one’s wage compared with other employees in the same industry or Zambia overall, and 
having received training is associated with the person rating their wage higher 
compared with the industry wage. It seems that these indicators are considered as a 
signal of a better job and pay in the absence of actual knowledge of the general wage 
level. Some of these effects persist even after controlling for the firm effects. Having a 
written contract  is also negatively correlated with  the intentions of resigning. 
Union members who do not participate as well as those who hold a role in the union 
perceive their wage to be lower compared with wages in other jobs requiring similar 
levels of skill at the same establishment, controlling for the logarithm of wage and other 
characteristics. Those who hold an official role within the union also consider their 
wages to be lower than people in current  in the same region in Zambia. These results 
may be either because union members have higher expectations of what their wage 
should be, or because people join a union because they assume their wage is below that 
of similar workers elsewhere. Active members are more likely to have a better 
awareness of the actual wage levels compared with at least their peers at the same 
establishment, but this is not necessarily true for the country or industry overall, as 
actual and representative wage data are typically not available in Zambia and the Labour 
Force Survey results are published with a considerable delay. It is also possible that the 
respondents would also only compare themselves with employees of the formal sector 
rather than with casual workers or, for example, rural small-scale farmers. 
Introducing firm dummies to the regression does reduce some coefficients to the status 
of “insignificant”, but given the other explanatory variables non-active union members 
are still more likely to consider their wage as being lower than that of their co-workers 
in jobs requiring similar levels of skill as the respondent’s. Those responents that have 
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an official role in the union, given their other characteristics, reckon their wages are 
lower than in the same region in Zambia in general. 
Interestingly, having a positive view of unions as such (controlling for union activism) is 
in turn linked to the individual having more positive perceptions of their wage and a 
lower likelihood of resigning. This provides some support for the theory of trust in the 
union “voice”: the effect may reduce unnecessary staff turnover and increase 
satisfaction. However, it does not seem to link to union membership as such but to 
generally positive views and trust in unions. 
Resignation intentions are another indicator of job satisfaction and lowering excess 
worker turnover of the potential benefits of unionisation. High trust in unions seems to 
be associated with lower intentions to quit (responses to the question “how likely it is 
that you will resign from your current job within the next twelve months?”), controlling 
for wage and other characteristics. This coefficient remains significant when we control 
for firm effects. Union membership or activism, however, does not have a statistically 
significant relationship with resignation intentions, so the reduction in excess turnover is 
more related to general trust in labour issues being looked after by unions. The level of 
trust is higher among active union members (though for inactive members actually 
lower than for non-members), but there is still variation within the levels of trust within 
each level of activism. All in all, the data shows some support for the hypothesis of the 
voice effect of unions reducing excess staff turnover. 
5.7 Determinants of occupational health and safety and the attitudes towards 
unions 
Decreasing the number of accidents and occupational hazards is potentially one of the 
main benefits of unionism. We estimated a regression where we also included 
composite variables from the union and human resources questionnaires in order to see 
whether their views on each other impacted on the occurrences of accidents or 
illnesses. The composite variables include how large a share of the positive views on 
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employers listed in the questionnaire the union representative agrees on, such as 
whether the management can be expected to act with honesty and integrity, whether 
they are professional, have a good knowledge of health and safety and labour law. A 
variable measuring trade union representatives’ own knowledge of labour law, wage 
and labour market issues, health and safety, negotiation skills and workers’ expectations 
is the average of their self-assessment of their level of knowledge regarding these. The 
views of employers on unions are similarly summarised in a variable which is the share 
of positive statements on unions (such as whether unions are efficient, flexible and 
useful in dealing with grievances) which they agree on, relative to the number of 
questions answered. For the estimations where we use these firm level variables we 
have not presented results with firm effects, as it is not possible, though these variables 
vary between firms, to credibly separate their impact from the unobservable firm 
effects if firm dummies are included. 
The dependent variables in these regressions are whether or not the employee has had 
an accident, the average of experiences of labour rights violations or malpractices (0 
never, 3 often) and witnessing them measured with a similar scale. 
None of the variables of interest have a statistically significant relationship to having had 
an accident or accidents, though having a written contract is almost statistically 
significantly (p-value 0.057) negatively correlated with accidents. A trade union 
representative’s self-rated knowledge of labour issues seems to have a positive 
correlation with the number of labour rights violations that have occurred to the 
respondent or their having witnessed them, whereas a higher wage has a negative 
correlation with these. If there is indeed causality at play, it is likely that well-informed 
trade union representatives keep the staff more informed about their rights and what 
constitutes malpractice. On the other hand, it may also be that constant labour rights 
violations in an establishment have forced the local trade union representative to 
educate themselves on labour rights issues. 
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In order to explore what explains what determines whether employees turn to the 
union in case they have a grievance or a complaint we estimate a similar model where 
the dependent variable is in how large a share of listed issues (pay, hours of work, leave 
entitlement, occupational health and safety, contents of job, discrimination, dismissal) 
the union is the first point of contact. Another estimation is carried out for the share of 
sources of complaint where the respondent does not turn to anyone, and a third one for 
the share of issues for suggestions, where the union is used as the first point of contact. 
An employer having positive views of unions has a positive association with turning to a 
union as the first point of contact. This is logical, as having positive views probably also 
implies that the employer is more receptive to any information conveyed through the 
union. The association, however, disappears in alternative specifications where the 
outcome variable is treated as dichotomous5. Holding meetings between staff and 
management, on the other hand, has a negative association with the probability of 
turning to no-one, which suggests that they serve as a discussion platform that improves 
the exchange of information. No variable of interest seemed to explain the average of 
the number of issues where the union is used as the first point of contact for 
suggestions. 
6. Conclusions 
This study is based on the baseline data collected for the evaluation of the work that the 
Trade Union Solidarity Center (SASK) will be carrying out in Zambia. In addition to using 
the data we collected to describe the industrial relations and working conditions in the 
establishments we surveyed, we studied the relationship between union activism and 
attitudes towards unions and measures of job satisfaction, occupational health and 
                                                          
5 A tobit specification gives rather different results, but as there is a large number of zero values and 
assuming that there is a negative outcome though not observed seems unrealistic, a dichotomous 
specification is used in the robustness check. 
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safety and whether employees generally used unions as the channel through which they 
brought up grievances, complaints and suggestions. 
The respondents often feel that their wage is somewhat inadequate. Accidents and 
illnesses have been experienced by a minority of respondents, though not an 
insignificant share. These results as such are not surprising, though it is difficult to say 
whether they indicate that the establishments surveyed are particularly problematic as 
there is no point of comparison. 
Respondents’ perceptions of unions are rather positive. It seems, however, that the 
unions are not the first point of contact for a surprisingly large share of even those 
employees who are union members in the case of grievances and complaints. 
Nevertheless, the regression results provide some evidence of a potential positive 
impact of trust in the unions on subjective job satisfaction when measured by a 
subjective assessment of relative wage and resignation intentions. Employers’ positive 
views of unions are correlated with turning to unions, which indicates that mutual trust 
between employers and unions is important for unions’ ability to function as the 
“voice”. 
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APPENDIX  
Coefficients of variables of interest from the regressions 
 No firm fixed effects Firm fixed effects 
included 
 ln(wage) ln(wage) 
Member but does not 
participate at all 
0.0218 0.0692 
 (0.114) (0.140) 
   
Follows activities 
but does not actively 
participate 
-0.00425 -0.0494 
 (0.124) (0.164) 
   
Actively participates 
but has no official 
role within the union 
-0.184 -0.0882 
 (0.115) (0.160) 
   
Has an official role 
within the union 
-0.127 -0.0474 
 (0.126) (0.145) 
   
Constant 5.910*** 6.398*** 
 (0.519) (0.584) 
N 347 347 
Explanatory variables included in the regression: age, age squared, tenure, gender, education level 
dummies, occupational category, contract type, part-time dummy, training dummy, dummies indicating 
interview round, region and interviewer (in the first round) and sector. 
Robust, clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wage 
satisfaction 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
other employees 
at the same 
establishment 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
wages in other 
jobs requiring 
similar levels of 
skill at the same 
establishment 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
wages in other 
jobs requiring 
similar levels 
of skill in 
other 
establishments 
in the same 
region and 
industry 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared 
with the 
general wage 
level of 
people in 
employment 
in the same 
region in 
Zambia 
How likely  
respondent 
will resign 
within the 
next 12 
months 
Level of union 
activism 
      
Member but does 
not participate at 
all 
-0.272 -0.166 -0.487** -0.284 -0.136 0.0184 
 (0.141) (0.160) (0.172) (0.178) (0.198) (0.201) 
       
Follows activities 
but does not 
actively 
participate 
-0.235 0.0185 -0.316 -0.319 -0.339 -0.0165 
 (0.183) (0.199) (0.204) (0.248) (0.227) (0.271) 
       
Actively 
participates but 
has no official 
role within the 
union 
-0.139 -0.221 -0.250 -0.293 -0.404 -0.112 
 (0.204) (0.171) (0.227) (0.248) (0.217) (0.267) 
       
Has an official 
role within the 
union 
-0.406 -0.216 -0.611* -0.482 -0.899** 0.00636 
 (0.222) (0.261) (0.281) (0.280) (0.287) (0.387) 
       
Trust in unions 0.548* 0.327 0.523** 0.490* 0.193 -0.728* 
 (0.271) (0.213) (0.173) (0.233) (0.220) (0.288) 
       
Constant 0.465 1.307 0.356 1.271 0.108 6.911*** 
 (0.940) (1.146) (0.923) (0.782) (0.856) (1.291) 
N 324 323 329 330 322 335 
Explanatory variables included in the regression: age, age squared, tenure, gender, education level dummies, occupational 
category, contract type, part-time dummy, training dummy, dummies indicating interview round, region and interviewer (in 
the first round) and sector. 
Robust, clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
32 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wage 
satisfaction 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
other 
employees at 
the same 
establishment 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
wages in other 
jobs requiring 
similar levels 
of skill at the 
same 
establishment 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared with 
wages in other 
jobs requiring 
similar levels of 
skill in other 
establishments 
in the same 
region and 
industry 
Perception of 
own wage 
compared 
with the 
general wage 
level of 
people in 
employment 
in the same 
region in 
Zambia 
How likely 
respondent  
will resign 
within the 
next 12 
months 
       
Member but 
does not 
participate at all 
-0.214 -0.0756 -0.538* -0.352 -0.286 -0.0210 
 (0.242) (0.224) (0.233) (0.217) (0.243) (0.271) 
       
Follows 
activities but 
does not 
actively 
participate 
-0.240 0.0690 -0.330 -0.439 -0.573 0.125 
 (0.211) (0.291) (0.263) (0.283) (0.290) (0.297) 
       
Actively 
participates but 
has no official 
role within the 
union 
-0.0764 0.0186 -0.0801 -0.392 -0.633* -0.223 
 (0.271) (0.226) (0.280) (0.331) (0.305) (0.315) 
       
Has an official 
role within the 
union 
-0.346 -0.292 -0.577 -0.365 -0.890* 0.198 
 (0.271) (0.305) (0.329) (0.366) (0.370) (0.432) 
       
Trust in unions 0.434 0.305 0.605*** 0.454 0.0845 -0.737* 
 (0.299) (0.235) (0.172) (0.272) (0.232) (0.315) 
       
Constant 1.371 0.921 1.509 3.493** 2.442 5.323** 
 (1.158) (1.491) (1.369) (1.180) (1.354) (1.572) 
N 324 323 329 330 322 335 
Other explanatory variables included in the regression: age, age squared, tenure, gender, education level dummies, 
occupational category, contract type, part-time dummy, training dummy, dummies indicating interview round, region and 
interviewer (in the first round) and sector, and firm dummies. 
Robust, clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 Has had accident(s) Share of occurrences of 
labour rights violations or 
bad practices 
Share of labour rights violations 
or bad practices that respondent 
has witnessed 
Level of union activism    
Member but does not 
participate at all 
0.0189 0.0818 0.0453 
 (0.0651) (0.0785) (0.0888) 
    
Follows activities but 
does not actively 
participate 
0.0653 0.0477 0.0308 
 (0.0906) (0.141) (0.132) 
    
Actively participates but 
has no official role within 
the union 
0.119 0.348 0.338 
 (0.146) (0.198) (0.226) 
    
Has an official role 
within the union 
-0.0566 0.135 0.182 
 (0.153) (0.110) (0.160) 
    
Union representative's 
knowledge of labour 
issues 
0.0420 0.250* 0.262* 
 (0.0575) (0.108) (0.110) 
    
Trade unions positive 
views on employer 
0.139 -0.0829 0.0236 
 (0.132) (0.168) (0.192) 
    
Meetings between staff 
and management 
0.0576 -0.0415 -0.112 
 (0.0556) (0.101) (0.119) 
    
Employers positive views 
on trade unions 
0.0221 -0.0324 -0.259 
 (0.187) (0.241) (0.267) 
    
Constant 0.0265 -0.0815 0.730 
 (0.498) (0.907) (0.904) 
N 228 226 225 
Other explanatory variables included in the regression: age, age squared, tenure, gender, education level dummies, 
occupational category, contract type, part-time dummy, training dummy, dummies indicating interview round, region and 
interviewer (in the first round) and sector. 
Robust, clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 Share of sources of 
complaints in which 
the first point of 
contact is union 
Share of sources of 
complaints where 
no-one is turned to 
Share of topics for 
suggestion where 
union is the first 
point of contact 
Union 
representative's 
knowledge of 
labour issues 
-0.00837 0.0399 0.0487 
 (0.0625) (0.0275) (0.0452) 
    
Trade unions 
positive views 
on employer 
-0.0970 -0.0450 -0.0389 
 (0.0771) (0.0569) (0.0730) 
    
Meetings 
between staff 
and 
management 
0.00765 -0.0731** 0.0486 
 (0.0426) (0.0256) (0.0367) 
    
Employers 
positive views 
on trade unions 
0.394* -0.0354 0.124 
 (0.169) (0.0881) (0.186) 
    
Constant -0.199 0.105 -0.0965 
 (0.349) (0.240) (0.250) 
N 232 232 234 
Other explanatory variables included in the regression: age, age squared, tenure, gender, education level dummies, 
occupational category, contract type, part-time dummy, training dummy, dummies indicating interview round, region and 
interviewer (in the first round) and sector. 
Robust, clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
